Because conceptions are a central form of knowledge within phenomenographic research, researchers have developed theoretical and analytical frameworks which help better explain their conceptual parts. There are two major frameworks, one based on understandings of intentionality and the other on understandings of awareness. These can be utilised independently or concurrently. Understandings of intentionality allow conceptions to be divided into what and how aspects, relating to the conception’s meaning; these can be broken further into an act, direct object, and indirect object. Understandings of awareness can be used to divide conceptions into structural and referential aspects, allowing researchers to better identify the structure of the conception and its context; the structural aspect can be further divided into an internal and external horizon. This paper reviews over 100 studies that have discussed or utilised these two frameworks. Similarities and differences in how these frameworks are interpreted are examined. Multiple studies were found where the difference between what and how aspects (relating to intentionality) and structural and referential aspects (relating to awareness) were unclear, highlighting ambiguities in some of the early writings relating to these frameworks. The internal and external horizons also drew differing interpretations. This review highlights the importance of explicitly linking usage of such a framework to theory and of clearly defining and explaining the parts of any frameworks utilised, justifying why the interpretation suits the phenomenon under study.