What we can conclude from this study is that the state and the market are not perfect substitutes in allocating resources and sustaining economic development separately. The case of the Thai cassava industry seems to suggest that the Thai state is not benevolent, but predatory in nature. The central point is that the Thai state cannot be simply seen as weak and predatory without understanding the dysfunction of the Thai institutions. Both formal and informal institutions in Thai society have been playing a significant role in shaping the economic policy choice. The case of the cassava industry shows that the administrative law is the main legal system empowering the elected politicians and government bureaucrats to administer the country. This path-dependency has allowed elite groups to easily abuse power without being checked by the legislative and judicial systems like in other developed countries. Since the middle of the 1970s, the Thai political economy has been seen as semi-democratic. However, the roles of vested-interest groups and other non-government groups have been growing, but they are limited by the fact that the country has been ruled by the administrative law. The case of the cassava industry also suggests that an international organisation like the GATT was not inclined to help a less developing country like Thailand to protect its rights as a contracting party. The Voluntary Export Restraint between the European Community and Thailand indicates that the less developing countries cannot rely on this supranational organisation. If the VER had been accepted as the second best policy for Thailand, why could the Thai state not have chosen the best policy, namely auction quotas at the beginning of VER? The Thai state chose to implement an irrational policy as shown throughout this thesis. The point that should be emphasised is that the Thai state is weak in the sense that it could not create immunity to rent-seeking activity and lacked the capacity to enforce rational modernisation measures among people bound by patron-client relationships, partly because the bureaucratic polity and the administrative law permitted the state apparatus to abuse power. The moral hazards are the case in point. Furthermore, the state has remained in power without being challenged and dramatic changes over more than half a century have made the Thai state less accountable to civil society. Moreover, the large number of cassava farmers who are poor and less educated should have been strong and united to bargain with the state, but that did not come into existence. The abuse of power can obviously be seen in the quota allocation policy over 15 years to the extent that announced policies could be subject to unexpected change without any good reason.