This dissertation examines the factors that influence the IMF's lending decisions to see how political factors influence these decisions. While it includes the standard economic criteria on which the IMF bases its decisions, it also explores the political factors that may influence these decisions. The heart of the approach is to examine the make-up of the U.S. legislative branch committees that oversee the IMF. The main thesis is that the IMF's lending decisions are affected by U.S. politics, and in fact the evidence suggests that this is the case. Specifically, oversight committee members benefit if IMF lending goes to countries that trade with a committee member's state, especially in the case of committee members who are part of the U.S. House of Representatives. For example, in 1996 Congressman Ros-Lehtinen from Florida chaired the House Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade. In that same year, 17.6 percent of U.S. exports to Argentina came from Florida. Thus Congressman Ros-Lehtinen would have an incentive to favor IMF support to Argentina, since this is likely to generate direct economic benefits to his home constituency. Generally, the dissertation tested this thesis by examining the relationship between the composition of congressional oversight committees and IMF's lending decisions. The extent to which a committee member's state trades with a foreign country is the key determinant of the political support for IMF lending policy. The results show that factors other than the economic factors that the IMF publicly states are important, such as real gross domestic product per capita, the size of the population and the external debt ratio, are indeed important. The trade relationships of states that had house representatives on IMF oversight committees showed significant correlation with actual IMF decisions to grant loans, though little evidence of this was found for the senate.