This thesis is an attempt to describe and analyze the philosophy of Willard Van Orman Quine with regard to two notions which have become the center a continuing controversy in contemporary American philosophy. It is my thesis that these notion, analyticity and translation, are closely related within Quine’s philosophy. It is also my thesis that although these notions are relatively unimportant in themselves, they are important in relationship to the implications which may be derived from either accepting or rejecting them, especially as regards the theory of meaning. Quine’s philosophy is noted for its rejection of traditional or intuitive or uncritical notions of analyticity and translation. In my thesis, I will analyze Quine’s arguments against the analytic-synthetic distinction and some of the discussion which that denial provoked. It is part of my thesis that Quine’s denial is consistent with the positivistic, behavioristic, and pragmatic starting points of Professor Quine. Quine’s philosophy is also noted for its indeterminacy of translation thesis which amounts to a rejection of the traditional notion of determinate translation. In my thesis I will analyze Quine’s arguments for the indeterminacy of radical translation. It is part of my thesis that this notion of the indeterminacy of radical translation is consistent with Quine’s epistemology and central to his theory of meaning. It is my thesis that Quine’s denial of the analytic synthetic distinction and his indeterminacy of radical translation thesis are most significant because of the role they play in allowing Quine to reject a science of the mental. This means that “meanings” as entities and propositional attitudes are no longer viable alternatives in any positivistic theory of meaning and/or truth. It also means that a satisfactory philosophy of linguistics can be based upon the observation of human response to sentential stimulation. It is my thesis that an analysis of the Quinian arguments leads to a new a fresh metaphilosophy. That is to say, the Quinian approach to philosophy and Quine’s philosophy itself allow us to reach new insights and outlooks concerning the very activity of philosophy, which make the philosophical activity a more “meaningful” and acceptable alternative. I feel that a clear understanding of the philosophy of Quine, expecially as it concerns itself with the two notions under consideration in my thesis, will lead to a more realistic perspective as regards the relationship between language and the world (the “object” and the “word”) as well as to a more profitable attitude as regards the relationship between philosophy and the other disciplines.

Thesis (M.A.)--Chulalongkorn University,1979